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Abstract
We provide a new provably-secure steganographic encryption protocol that is proven secure in the
complexity-theoretic framework of Hopper et al.
The fundamental building block of our steganographic encryption protocol is a “one-time stegosystem”
that allows two parties to transmit messages of length shorter than the shared key with information-
theoretic security guarantees. The employment of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) permits secure
transmission of longer messages in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad
encryption for messages longer than the key in symmetric encryption. The advantage of our construction,
compared to that of Hopper et al., is that it avoids the use of a pseudorandom function family and instead
relies (directly) on a pseudorandom generator in a way that provides linear improvement in the number
of applications of the underlying one-way permutation per transmitted bit. This advantageous trade-off
is achieved by substituting the pseudorandom function family employed in the previous construction with
an appropriate combinatorial construction that has been used extensively in derandomization, namely
almost t-wise independent function families.
Keywords: Information hiding, steganography, data hiding, steganalysis, covert communication.
1 Introduction
In a canonical steganographic scenario, Alice and Bob wish to communicate securely in the presence of an
adversary, called the “Warden,” who monitors whether they exchange “conspicuous” messages. In partic-
ular, Alice and Bob may exchange messages that adhere to a certain channel distributions that represents
“inconspicuous” communication. By controlling the messages that are transmitted over such a channel, Alice
and Bob may exchange messages that cannot be detected by the Warden. There have been two approaches in
formalizing this problem, one based on information theory [2, 13, 7] and one based on complexity theory [6].
The latter approach is more concrete and has the potential of allowing more efficient constructions. Most
steganographic constructions supported by provable security guarantees are instantiations of the following
basic procedure (often referred to as “rejection-sampling”).
The problem specifies a family of message distributions (the “channel distributions”) that provide a
number of possible options for a so-called “covertext” to be transmitted. Additionally, the sender and the
receiver possess some sort of private information (typically a keyed hash function, MAC, or other similar
function) that maps channel messages to a single bit. In order to send a message bit m, the sender draws a
∗Supported by NSF CAREER grant CCR-0447808.
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covertext from the channel distribution, applies the function to the covertext and checks whether it happens
to produce the “stegotext”m he originally wished to transmit. If this is the case, the covertext is transmitted.
In case of failure, this procedure is repeated. While this is a fairly concrete procedure, there are a number
of choices to be made with both practical and theoretical significance. From the security viewpoint, one is
primarily interested in the choice of the function that is shared between the sender and the receiver. From a
practical viewpoint, one is primarily interested in how the channel is implemented and whether it conforms
to the various constraints that are imposed on it by the steganographic protocol specifications (e.g., are
independent draws from the channel allowed? does the channel remember previous draws? etc.).
As mentioned above, the security of a stegosystem can be naturally phrased in information-theoretic
terms (cf. [2]) or in complexity-theoretic terms [6]. Informally, the latter approach considers the following
experiment for the warden-adversary: The adversary selects a message to be embedded and receives either
covertexts that embed the message or covertexts simply drawn from the channel distribution (without any
embedding). The adversary is then asked to distinguish between the two cases. Clearly, if the probabil-
ity of success is very close to 1/2 it is natural to claim that the stegosystem provides security against such
(eavesdropping) adversarial activity. Formulation of stronger attacks (such as active attacks) is also possible.
Given the above framework, Hopper et al. [6] provided a provably secure stegosystem that pairs rejection
sampling with a pseudorandom function family. Given that rejection sampling, when implemented properly
and paired with a truly random function, is indistinguishable from the channel distribution, the security of
their construction followed from the pseudorandom function family assumption. From the efficiency view-
point, this construction required about 2 evaluations of the pseudorandom function per bit transmission.
Constructing efficient pseudorandom functions is possible either generically [5] or, more efficiently, based on
specific number-theoretic assumptions [9]. Nevertheless, pseudorandom function families are a conceptually
complex and fairly expensive cryptographic primitive. For example, the evaluation of the Naor-Reingold
pseudorandom function on an input x requires O(|x|) modular exponentiations. Similarly, the generic con-
struction [5] requires O(k) PRG doublings of the input string where k is the length of the key.
In this article we take an alternative approach to the design of provably secure stegosystems. Our main
contribution is the design of a building block that we call a one-time stegosystem: this is a steganographic
protocol that is meant to be used for a single message transmission and is proven secure in an information-
theoretic sense, provided that the key that is shared between the sender and the receiver is of sufficient
length (this length analysis is part of our result). In particular we show that we can securely transmit an n
bit message with a key of length O(n + log |Σ|); here Σ is the size of the channel alphabet (see Section 3.4
for more details regarding the exact complexity). Our basic building block is a natural analogue of a one
time-pad for steganography. It is based on the rejection sampling technique outlined above in combination
with an explicit almost t-wise independent [1] family of functions. We note that such combinatorial con-
structions have been extremely useful for derandomization methods and here, to the best of our knowledge,
are employed for the first time in the design of steganographic protocols. Given a one-time stegosystem, it is
fairly straightforward to construct provably secure steganographic encryption for longer messages by using
a pseudorandom generator (PRG) to stretch a random seed that is shared by the sender and the receiver to
sufficient length.
The resulting stegosystem is provably secure in the computational sense of Hopper et al. [6] and is in
fact much more efficient: in particular, while the Hopper, et al. stegosystem requires 2 evaluations per bit of
a pseudorandom function, amounting to a linear (in the key-size) number of applications of the underlying
PRG (in the standard construction for pseudorandom functions of [5]), in our stegosystem we require per bit
a constant number of PRG applications.
2 Definitions and Tools
We say that a function µ : N → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(.) there exists an N such
that for all n > N , µ(n) < 1p(n) .
We let Σ = {σ1, . . . , σs} denote an alphabet and treat the channel, which will be used for data transmis-
sion, as a family of random variables C = {Ch}h∈Σ∗ ; each Ch is supported on Σ. These channel distributions
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model a history-dependent notion of channel data: if h1, h2, . . . , hℓ have been sent along the channel thus
far, Ch1,...,hℓ determines the distribution of the next channel element.
Definition 1. A one-time stegosystem consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
S = (SK, SE, SD)
where:
• SK is the key generation algorithm; we write SK (1n, log(1/ǫsec)) = k. It takes as input, the security
parameter ǫsec and the length of the message n and produces a key k of length κ. (We typically assume
that κ = κ(n) is a monotonically increasing function of n.)
• SE is the embedding procedure, which can access the channel; SE (1n, k,m, h) = s ∈ Σ∗. It takes as
input the length of the message n, the key k, a message m ∈ Mn , {0, 1}
n to be embedded, and the
history h of previously drawn covertexts. The output is the stegotext s ∈ Σ∗.
• SD is the extraction procedure; SD (1n, k, c ∈ Σ∗) = m or fail. It takes as input n, k, and some
c ∈ Σ∗. The output is a message m or the token fail.
Recall that the min entropy of a random variable X , taking values in a set V , is the quantity
H∞(X) , min
v∈V
(− logPr[X = v]) .
We say that a channel C has min entropy δ if for all h ∈ Σ∗, H∞(Ch) ≥ δ.
Definition 2 (Soundness). A stegosystem (SK, SE, SD) is said to be (s(κ), δ)-sound provided that for all
channels C of minimum entropy δ,
∀m ∈Mn,Pr[SD(1
n, k, SE(1κ, k,m, h)) 6= m | k ← SK(1n, log(1/ǫsec))] ≤ s(κ) .
One-time stegosystem security is based on the indistinguishability between a transmission that contains
a steganographically embedded message and a transmission that contains no embedded messages. An ad-
versary A against a one-time stegosystem S = (SK, SE, SD) is a pair of algorithms A = (SA1, SA2), that
plays the following game, denoted GA(1n):
1. A key k is generated by SK(1n, log(1/ǫsec)).
2. Algorithm SA1 receives as input the length of the message n and outputs a triple (m
∗, s, hc) ∈ Mn ×
{0, 1}∗ ∗Σ∗, where s is some additional information that will be passed to SA2. SA1 is provided access
to C via an oracle O(h), which takes the history h as input.
O(·), on input h, returns to SA1 an element c selected according to Ch.
3. A bit b is chosen uniformly at random.
• If b = 0 let c∗ ← SE(1n, k,m∗, h), so c∗ is a stegotext.
• If b = 1 let c∗ = c1 ◦ · · · ◦ cλ, where ◦ denotes string concatenation and ci
r
← Ch◦c1◦···◦ci−1 .
4. The input for SA2 is 1
n, hc, c
∗ and s. SA2 outputs a bit b
′. If b′ = b then we say that (SA1, SA2)
succeeded and write GA(1n) = success.
The advantage of the adversary A over a stegosystem S is defined as:
AdvAS (n) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [G(1n) = success]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability includes the coin tosses ofA and SE, as well as the coin tosses ofG(1κ). The (information-
theoretic) insecurity of the stegosystem is defined as
InSecS(n) = max
A
{AdvAS (n)} ,
this maximum taken over all (time unbounded) adversaries A.
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Definition 3. (Security) We say that a stegosystem is (t(n), δ)-secure if for all channels with min entropy
δ we have InSecS(n) ≤ t(n).
2.1 Error-correcting Codes
Our steganographic construction requires an efficient family of codes that can recover from errors introduced
by certain binary symmetric channels. In particular, we require an efficient version of the Shannon coding
theorem [11, 10]. For an element x ∈ {0, 1}n, we let Bp(x) be the random variable equal to x ⊕ e, where
e ∈ {0, 1}n is a random error vector defined by independently assigning each ei = 1 with probability p. (Here
x⊕ e denotes the vector with ith coordinate equal to xi ⊕ ei.)
The classical coding theorem asserts that for every pair of real numbers 0 < R < C ≤ 1 and n ∈ N, there
is a binary code An ⊂ {0, 1}
n, with log |A|/n ≥ R, so that for each a ∈ A, maximum-likelihood decoding
recovers a from Bp(a) with probability 1− e
−θ(n), where
H(p) = p log p−1 + (1− p) log(1− p)−1 = 1− C .
The quantity C (determined by p), is the capacity of the binary symmetric channel induced by Bp; the
quantity R = log |A|/n is the rate of the code A. In this language, the coding theorem asserts that at rates
lower than capacity, codes exist that correct random errors with exponentially decaying failure probability.
We formalize our requirements below:
Definition 4. An error-correcting code is a pair of functions E = (Enc,Dec), where Enc : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ
is the encoding function and Dec : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n the corresponding decoding function. Specifically, we
say that E is a (n, ℓ, p, ǫ)-code if for all m ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr[Dec(Enc(m)⊕ e) = m] ≥ 1− ǫ
where e = (e1, . . . , eℓ) and each ei is independently distributed in {0, 1} so that Pr[ei = 1] ≤ p. We say that
E is efficient if both Enc and Dec are computable in polynomial time.
Proposition 1. Let τ = τ(n) lie in the interval (0, 1/4), p = 1/2− τ , and R′ = 1 −H(p). Let n ≥ 16 be a
message length for which (104 log (logn))3/logn ≤ τ2 . Then there is an efficient family of (n, ℓ(n), p, ǫ(n))-
error-correcting codes En for which
ǫ(n) ≤ e−4n/ logn and ℓ(n) ≤ (1 + 57/ 3
√
τ2 logn)2n/R′ .
Proof. This is a consequence of Forney’s [3] efficient realizations of the Shannon coding theorem [11, 10]; we
work out the technical details in the full version of the paper.
We refer to [12, 4] for detailed discussions of error-correcting codes over binary symmetric channels.
2.2 Function Families and Almost t-wise Independence
We will employ the notion of (almost) t-wise independent function families (cf. [1], [8]).
Definition 5. A family F of Boolean functions on {0, 1}n is said to be ǫ-away from t-wise independent or
(n, t, ǫ)-independent if for any t distinct domain elements q1, q2, . . . , qt we have
∑
α∈{0,1}t
∣∣∣∣Prf [fk(q1)fk(q2) · · · fk(qt) = α]− 12t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ , (1)
where f chosen uniformly from F.
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The above is equivalent to the following formulation quantified over all computationally unbounded
adversaries A: ∣∣∣ Pr
f
r
←F
[GA
f[t]
(1κ) = 1]− Pr
f
r
←R
[GA
f[t]
(1κ) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ , (2)
where R is the collection of all functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1} and Af [t] is an unbounded adversary that is
allowed to determine up to t queries to the function f before he outputs his bit.
Lemma 2. Fκ is ǫ
′-away from t-wise independence according to equation (1) if and only if Fκ is ǫ
′-away
from t-wise independence according to equation (2) above.
We employ the construction of almost t-wise independent sample spaces given by [8], [1].
Theorem 3 ([8], [1]). There exist families of Boolean functions Fnt,ǫ on {0, 1}
n that are ǫ-away from t-wise
independent, are indexed by keys of length (2+o(1))(log logn+ t2+log 1/ǫ), and are computable in polynomial
time.
2.3 Rejection Sampling
A common method used in steganography employing a channel distribution is that of rejection sampling (cf.
[2, 6]). Assuming that one wishes to transmit a single bitm and employs a random function f : {0, 1}d×Σ→
{0, 1} that is secret from the adversary, one performs the following “rejection sampling” process:
rejsam
f
h(m)
c
r
← Ch
if f(c) 6= m
then c
r
← Ch
Output: c
Here, as above, Σ denotes the output alphabet of the channel, h denotes the history of the channel data at
the start of the process, and Ch denotes the distribution on Σ given by the channel after history h. The
receiver (also privy to the function f) applies the function to the received message c ∈ Σ and recoversm with
probability greater than 1/2. The sender and the receiver may employ a joint state denoted by i in the above
process (e.g., a counter), that need not be secret from the adversary. Note that the above process performs
only two draws from the channel with the same history (more draws could, in principle, be performed).
These draws are assumed to be independent. One basic property of rejection sampling that we use is:
Lemma 4. If f is drawn uniformly at random from the collection of all functions R = {f : Σ → {0, 1} }
and C has min entropy δ, then
Pr
f←R
[f(rejsamfh(m)) = m] ≥
1
2
+ τ ,
where τ = 14
(
1− 1
2δ
)
.
Proof. Define the event E to be
E = [f(c1) = m] ∨ [f(c1) 6= m ∧ f(c2) = m] ;
thus E is the event that rejection sampling is successful for m. Here c1, c2 are two independent random
variables distributed according to the channel distribution Ch and h is determined by the history of channel
usage. Recalling that Σ = {σ1, . . . , σs} is the support of the channel distribution Ch, let pi = Pr[Ch = σi]
denote the probability that σi occurs. As f is chosen uniformly at random,
Pr[f(c1) = m] = 1/2 .
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Then Pr[E] = 1/2+Pr[A], where A is the event that f(c1) 6= m∧ f(c2) = m. To bound Pr[A], let D denote
the event that c1 6= c2. Observe that conditioned on D, A occurs with probability exactly 1/4; on the other
hand, A cannot occur simultaneously with D. Thus
Pr[E] =
1
2
+ Pr[A | D] · Pr[D] + Pr[A | D] · Pr[D] =
1
2
+
1
4
Pr[D] .
To bound Pr[D], note that
Pr[D¯] =
∑
i
p2i ≤ max
i
pi
∑
i
pi = max
i
pi
and hence that Pr[D] ≥ 1 −maxi pi. Considering that H∞(C) ≥ δ, we have maxi pi ≤
1
2δ
and the success
probability is
Pr[E] ≥
1
2
+
1
4
· (1− pi) ≥
1
2
+
1
4
(
1−
1
2δ
)
=
1
2
+ τ ,
where τ = 14
(
1− 1
2δ
)
.
3 The construction
In this section we outline our construction of a one-time stegosystem as an interaction between Alice (the
sender) and Bob (the receiver). Alice and Bob wish to communicate over a channel with distribution C.
We assume that C has min entropy δ, so that ∀h ∈ Σ∗, H∞(Ch) ≥ δ. As above, let τ =
1
4
(
1− 12δ
)
. For
simplicity, we assume that the support of Ch is of size |Σ| = 2
b.
3.1 A one-time stegosystem
Fix an alphabet Σ for the channel and choose a message length n and security parameter ǫF. Alice and Bob
agree on the following:
An error-correcting code. Let E = (Enc,Dec) be an efficient (n, λ, 12 − τ, ǫenc)-error-correcting code;
A pseudorandom function family. Let F be a function family that is (logλ+log |Σ|, 2λ, ǫF)-independent.
We treat elements of F as Boolean functions on {1, . . . , λ} × Σ and, for such a function f we let
fi : Σ→ {0, 1} denote the function fi(σ) = f(i, σ).
We will analyze the stegosystem below in terms of arbitrary parameters λ, ǫF, and ǫenc, relegating discussion
of how these parameters determine the overall efficiency of the system to Section 3.4.
Key generation consists of selecting an element f ∈ F. Alice and Bob then communicate using the
algorithms SE for embedding and SD for extracting as described in Figure 1. In SE, after applying the
error-correcting code E, we use rejsamfih (mi) to obtain an element ci of the channel for each bit mi of the
message. The resulting stegotext c1 . . . cλ is denoted cstego. In SD the received stegotext is parsed block by
block by evaluating the key function fi at ci; this results in a message bit. After performing this for each
received block, a message of size λ is received, which is subjected to decoding via Dec. Note that we sample
at most twice from the channel for each bit we wish to send. The error-correcting code is needed to recover
from the errors introduced by this process. The detailed security and correctness analysis follow in the next
two sections.
3.2 Correctness
We focus on the mapping between {0, 1}λ and Σλ determined by the SE procedure of the one-time stegosys-
tem. In particular, for an initial history h and a key function f : {1, . . . , λ} × Σ → {0, 1}, recall that the
covertext of the message m is given by the procedure P f(m) = P fh (m), described in Figure 2; here h is the
initial history. We remark now that the procedure defining P f samples f at no more than 2λ points and that
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PROCEDURE SE: PROCEDURE SD:
Input: Key k, hidden text m′, Input: Key k, stegotext cstego
history h
let m = Enc(m′)
parse m as m = m1m2 . . .mλ parse cstego as c = c1c2 . . . cλ
for i = 1 to λ { for i = 1 to λ {
ci =rejsam
fi
h (mi) set m¯i = fi(ci)
set h← h ◦ ci let m¯ = m¯1m¯2 . . . m¯λ
} }
Output: cstego = c1c2 . . . cλ ∈ Σ
λ Output: Dec(m¯)
Figure 1: Encryption and Decryption algorithms for the one-time stegosystem of 3.1.
Pfh : {0, 1}
λ → Σλ
input: h, m = m1 . . .mλ ∈ {0, 1}
λ
for i = 1 to λ
ci =rejsam
fi
h (mi)
h← h ◦ ci
output: c = c1 . . . cλ ∈ Σ
λ
Figure 2: The procedure P fh .
the family F used in SE is ǫF-away from 2λ-wise independent. For a string c = c1 . . . cλ ∈ Σ
λ and a function
f , let Rf(c) = (f1(c1), . . . , fλ(cλ)) ∈ {0, 1}
λ. If f were chosen uniformly among all Boolean functions on
{1, . . . , λ}×Σ then we could conclude from Lemma 4 above that each bit is independently recovered by this
process with probability at least 12 + τ . As E is an (n, λ,
1
2 − τ, ǫenc)-error-correcting code, this would imply
that
Pr
f←R
[Rf (P fh (m)) = m] ≥ 1− ǫenc .
This is a restatement of the correctness analysis of Hopper, et al [6]. Recalling that the procedure defining
Rf (P fh (·)) involves no more than 2λ samples of f , condition (2) following Definition 5 implies that
Pr
f←F
[Rf (P fh (m)) = m] ≥ 1− ǫenc − ǫF (3)
so long as F is (logλ+ log |Σ|, 2λ, ǫF)-independent. (We remark that as described above, the procedure P
f
h
depends on the behavior of channel; note, however, that if there were a sequence of channel distributions
which violated (3) then there would be a fixed sequence of channel responses, and thus a deterministic
process P f , which also violated (3).) To summarize
Lemma 5. With SE and SD described as above, the probability that a message m is recovered from the
stegosystem is at least 1− ǫenc − ǫF.
3.3 Security
In this section we argue about the security of our one-time stegosystem. First we will observe that the
output of the rejection sampling function rejsamfh, with a truly random function f , is indistinguishable from
the channel distribution Ch. (This is a folklore result implicit in previous work.) We then show that if f
is selected from a family that is ǫF-away from 2λ-wise independent, the advantage of an adversary A to
distinguish between the output of the protocol and Ch is bounded above by ǫF. Let R = {f : Σ → {0, 1}}.
First we characterize the probability distribution of the rejection sampling function:
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Proposition 6. The function rejsamfh(m) is a random variable with probability distribution expressed by the
following function: Let c ∈ Σ and m ∈ {0, 1}. Let missf (m) = Prc′←Ch [f(c
′) 6= m] and pc = Prc′←Ch [c
′ = c].
Then
Pr[rejsamfh(m) = c] =
{
pc · (1 +missf (m)) if f(c) = m ,
pc ·missf (m) if f(c) 6= m .
Proof. Let c1 and c2 be the two (independent) samples drawn from Ch during rejection sampling. (For
simplicity, we treat the process as having drawn two samples even in the case where it succeeds on the first
draw.) Note, now, that in the case where f(c) 6= m, the value c is the result of the rejection sampling
process precisely when f(c1) 6= m and c2 = c; as these samples are independent, this occurs with probability
missf (m) · pc.
In the case where f(c) = m, however, we observe c whenever c1 = c or f(c1) 6= m and c2 = c. As these
events are disjoint, their union occurs with probability pc · (missf (m) + 1), as desired.
Lemma 7. For any h ∈ Σ∗,m ∈ {0, 1}, the random variable rejsamfh(m) is perfectly indistinguishable from
the channel distribution Ch when f is drawn uniformly at random from the space of R.
Proof. Let f be a random function, as described in the statement of the lemma. Fixing the elements c, and
m, we condition on the event E6=, that f(c) 6= m. In light of Proposition 6, for any f drawn under this
conditioning we shall have that Pr[rejsamfh(m) = c] is equal to
Pr
c′←Ch
[c′ = c] ·missf (m) = pc ·missf (m) ,
where we have written missf (m) = Prc′←Ch [f(c
′) 6= m] and pc = Prc′←Ch [c
′ = c]. Conditioned on E6=, then,
the probability of observing c is
Ef [pc ·missf (m) | E6=] = pc
(
pc +
1
2
(1− pc)
)
.
Letting E= be the event that f(i, c) = m, we similarly compute
Ef [pc ·missf (m) | E=] = pc
(
1 +
1
2
(1− pc)
)
.
As Pr[E=] = Pr[E6=] = 1/2, we conclude that the probability of observing c is exactly
1
2
(
pc
(
pc +
1− pc
2
)
+ pc
(
1 +
1− pc
2
))
= pc ,
as desired.
The following corollary follows immediately from the lemma above.
Corollary 8. For any h ∈ Σ∗,m ∈ {0, 1}λ, the random variable P fh is perfectly indistinguishable from the
channel distribution Cλh when f is drawn uniformly at random from the space of all Boolean functions on
{1, . . . , λ} × Σ.
Having established the behavior of the rejection sampling function when a truly random function is used,
we proceed to examine the behavior of rejection sampling in our setting where the function is drawn from a
function family that is ǫF-away from 2λ-wise independence. In particular we will show that the insecurity
of the defined stegosystem is characterized as follows:
Lemma 9. The insecurity of the stegosystem S of Section 3.1 is bound by ǫF, i.e., InSecS(n) ≤ ǫF, where ǫF
is the bias of the almost 2λ-wise independent function family employed; recall that λ = ℓ(n) is the stretching
of the input incurred due to the error-correcting code.
Proof. Let us play the following game G(1κ) with the adversary A.
In each round we either select GA1 or G
A
2 :
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GA1 (1
κ)
1. k ← {0, 1}κ
2. (m∗, s)← SA
O(h)
1 (1
κ, h), m∗ ∈ {0, 1}n
3. b
r
← {0, 1}
4. c∗ =
{
c0, c1, . . . cλ−1 ci = rejsam
fk,i
h (mi), h = h ◦ c if b = 0
from the channel if b = 1
5. b∗ ← SA2(c
∗, s)
6. if b = b∗ then success
GA2 (1
κ)
1. f ← R
2. (m∗, s)← SA
O(h)
1 (1
κ, h), m∗ ∈ {0, 1}n
3. b
r
← {0, 1}
4. c∗ =
{
c0, c1, . . . cλ−1 ci = rejsam
f,i
h (mi), h = h ◦ c if b = 0
from the channel if b = 1
5. b∗ ← SA2(c
∗, s)
6. if b = b∗ then success
AdvAS (G(1
κ)) =
∣∣∣Pr[AO(h),c∗←SE(k,.,.,.) = 1]− Pr[AO(h),c∗←Ch = 1]∣∣∣
= Pr
f←Fκ
[G(1κ) = 1]− Pr
f←R
[G(1κ) = 1] ≤ ǫF
and the lemma follows by the definition of insecurity.
3.4 Putting it all together
The objective of this section is to integrate the results of the previous sections of the paper into one unifying
theorem. As our system is built over two-sample rejection sampling, a process that faithfully transmits each
bit with probability 1/2 + τ , we cannot hope to achieve rate exceeding
R′ = 1−H(1/2 + τ) = 1−H(1/4 + 2−δ/4) .
Indeed, as described in the theorem below, the system asymptotically converges to the rate of this underlying
rejection sampling channel. (We remark that with sufficiently large channel entropy, one can draw more
samples during rejection sampling without interfering with security; this can control the noise introduced by
rejection sampling.)
Theorem 10. For δ = Ω(
√
(log logn)3/ logn) the stegosystem S uses private keys k of length no more than
(2 + o(1)) [λ(n) + log 1/ǫF + log log log |Σ|]
and is both (ǫenc + ǫF, δ)-sound and (ǫF, δ)-secure. The length of the stegotext λ(n) is
λ(n) ≤
(
1 +
1
log(logn)
)2
n
R′
,
where ǫenc ≤ e
−4n/ logn and R′ = 1−H
(
1/4 + 2−δ/4
)
.
Proof. Let Σ = {σ1, . . . , σs} denote an alphabet and define the channel as a family of random variables
C = {Ch}h∈Σ∗ ; each Ch supported on Σ. Also, the channel C has min entropy δ, so that ∀h ∈ Σ
∗,
H∞(Ch) ≥ δ. Fix an alphabet Σ for the channel and choose a message length n ≥ 16 such that
− log
(
1− 4
√
104 log (logn)
3
/logn
)
≤ δ .
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Under the assumption that the channel C has min entropy δ, the binary symmetric channel induced by the
rejection sampling process of Lemma 4 has transition probability no more than 1/4(1 + 2−δ). We have an
efficient (n, λ, 14 (1 + 2
−δ), ǫenc) error-correcting code as discussed in Section 2.1 that encodes messages of
length n as codewords of length
λ(n) =
(
1 +
57
3
√
τ2 logn
)2
n
R′
≤
(
1 +
1
log(logn)
)2
n
R′
bits
(2 + o(1)) [λ(n) + log 1/ǫF + log log log |Σ|]
random bits; these serve as the key for the stegosystem. In light of the conclusions of Lemma 9 and Lemma 5,
this system achieves the (ǫenc + ǫF, δ)-soundness and (ǫF, δ)-security.
For concreteness, we record two corollaries:
Corollary 11. There exists a function δ(n) = o(1) so that the stego system S, using private keys k of length
no more than
O (n+ log |Σ|+ log 1/ǫF) ,
is both (e−4n/ logn + ǫF, δ)-sound and (ǫF, δ)-secure. Here, the length of the stegotext is
λ(n) = (1 + o(1))
n
R′
where R′ = 1−H
(
1/4(1 + 2−δ)
)
.
Corollary 12. For any constant δ, the stegosystem S uses private keys of length O(n+ logΣ+ log ǫF) and
transmits no more than O(n) symbols.
4 A provably secure stegosystem for longer messages
In this section we show how to apply the “one-time” stegosystem of Section 3.1 together with a pseudorandom
number generator so that longer messages can be transmitted.
Definition 6. Let Ul denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}
l. A polynomial time deterministic program
G is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if the following conditions are satisfied:
Variable output For all seeds x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and y ∈ N, |G(x, 1y)| = y and, furthermore, G(x, 1y) is a prefix
of G(x, 1y+1).
Pseudorandomness For every polynomial p the set of random variables {G(Ul, 1
p(l))}l∈N is computation-
ally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution Up(l).
Note that there is a procedure G′ that if z = G(x, 1y) it holds that G(x, 1y+y
′
) = G′(x, z, 1y
′
) (i.e., if one
maintains z, one can extract the y′ bits that follow the first y bits without starting from the beginning). For
a PRG G, if A is some statistical test, then we define the advantage of A over the PRNG as follows:
AdvAG(l) =
∣∣∣∣∣ Prlˆ←G(Ul,1p(l))[A(lˆ) = 1]− Prlˆ←Up(l)[A(lˆ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣
The insecurity of the PRNG G is then defined
InSecPRGG (l) = maxA{Adv
A
G(l)} .
Note that typically in PRGs there is a procedure G′ as well as the process G(x, 1y) produces some aux-
iliary data auxy of small length so that the rightmost y
′ bits of G(x, 1y+y
′
) may be sampled directly as
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G′(x, 1y
′
, auxy). Consider now the following stegosystem S
′ = (SE′, SD′) that can be used for arbitrary
many and long messages and employs a PRG G and the one-time stegosystem (SK, SE, SD) of Section 3.1.
The two players Alice and Bob, share a key of length l denoted by x. They also maintain a state N that
holds the number of bits that have been transmitted already as well the auxiliary information auxN (initially
empty). The function SE′ is given input N, auxN , x,m ∈ {0, 1}
n where m is the message to be transmitted.
SE′ in turn employs the PRG G to extract a number of bits κ as follows k = G′(x, 1κ, auxN ). The length κ
is selected to match the number of key bits that are required to transmit the message m using the one-time
stegosystem of section 3.1. Once the key k is produced by the PRG the procedure SE′ invokes the one-time
stegosystem on input k,m, h. After the transmission is completed the history h, the count N , as well as the
auxiliary PRG information auxN are updated accordingly. The function SD
′ is defined in a straightforward
way based on SD.
Theorem 13. The stegosystem S′ = (SE′, SD′) is provably secure in the model of [6] (universally stegano-
graphically secret against chosen hiddentext attacks); in particular
InSecSSS′ (t, q, l) ≤ InSec
PRG(t+ γ(ℓ(l)), ℓ(l) + polylog(l))
(where t is the time required by the adversary, q is the number of chosen hiddentext queries it makes, l is the
total number of bits across all queries and γ(v) is the time required to simulate the SE′ oracle for v bits).
4.1 Performance Comparison of the Stegosystem S ′ and the Hopper, Langford,
von Ahn System
The system of Hopper, et al. [6] concerns a situation where the min entropy of all Ch is at least 1 bit.
In this case, we may select an (n, λ, 3/8, ǫenc)-error-correcting code E. Then the system of Hopper, et al.
correctly decodes a given message with probability at least 1 − ǫenc and makes no more than 2λ calls to a
pseudorandom function family. Were one to use the pseudorandom function family of Goldreich, Goldwasser,
and Micali [5], then this involves production of Θ(λ · k · (log(|Σ|)+ log λ)) pseudorandom bits, where k is the
security parameter of the pseudorandom function family. Of course, the security of the system depends on
the security of the underlying pseudorandom generator. On the other hand, with the same error-correcting
code, the steganographic system described above utilizes O [log log log |Σ|+ λ+ log 1/ǫF] pseudorandom bits,
correctly decodes a given message with probability 1 − (ǫenc + ǫF), and possesses insecurity no more than
ǫF. In order to compare the two schemes, note that by selecting ǫF = 2
−k, both the decoding error and the
security of the two systems differ by at most 2−k, a negligible function in terms of the security parameter k.
(Note also that pseudorandom functions utilized in the above scheme have security no better than 2−k with
security parameter k.) In this case, the number of pseudorandom bits used by our system,
(2 + o(1))
[
λ(n) + log 1/ǫF + log log log |Σ|
]
,
is a dramatic improvement over the Θ(λk log(|Σ|λ)) bits of the scheme above.
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